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NOTES
CIVIL PROCEDURE - Collateral Estoppel - Collateral
Estoppel Applied Offensively Where Plaintiffs Were Not
Parties or Privies in Prior Action. Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 99 S. Ct. 645 (1979). In an effort to promote judicial
economy and reduce unmanageable case loads, courts have,
over the last forty years, significantly expanded the use of the
doctrine .of collateral estoppel. Recently, several courts have
allowed a plaintiff who was not a party to a prior action to
assert the doctrine to prevent a defendant from relitigating issues determined in that prior action. Other courts, however,
have been reluctant to allow this "offensive" use of collateral
estoppel claiming it is often unfair to a defendant. The recent
case of Parklane Hosiery Company v. Shore' presented the
United States Supreme Court with the question of whether
Parklane, which had had issues of fact determined adversely
to it in an action for an injunction brought by the Securities
and Exchange Commission, could be collaterally estopped
from relitigating the same issues in a subsequent stockholder
class action seeking damages. In holding that the doctrine
could be used, the Court promulgated a two-part test designed
to foster judicial economy and consistency of judgments, while
assuring that the rights of a defendant are adequately protected. The Court's test, however, seems inadequate to accomplish these objectives and demonstrates the need for a more
effective judicial formulation to regulate the offensive use of
collateral estoppel.
I.

BACKGROUND

In order to protect parties from the expense and vexation
of relitigating matters already determined, conserve judicial
resources 2 and promote confidence in the judicial system by
minimizing the possibility of inconsistent judgments, courts
have developed the doctrine of judicial finality, which is comprised of the related but distinct concepts of res judicata and
collateral estoppel. 3 Under res judicata, or "claim preclusion,"
1. 99 S. Ct. 645 (1979).
2. Montana v. United States, 99 S. Ct. 970, 974 (1979); 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 7 0.441[21 (2d ed. 1979) (citing Tillman v. Nat'l City Bank, 118 F.2d 631,
634 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 650 (1941)).
3. 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTrCE 7 0.405[31 (2d ed. 1979).
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a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction operates to bar a party from bringing a second suit based on the same cause of action.4 Collateral estoppel, or "issue preclusion," prevents an issue actually and
necessarily determined adversely to a party in an action before
a court of competent jurisdiction from being disputed by such
party in a subsequent action based upon a different cause of
action.5
Collateral estoppel can be asserted to preclude a party
from litigating an issue only where an identical isssue has
been litigated and in fact determined in a prior action. In addition, the judgment in the prior action must be dependent
upon the determination of the issue. 6 Until recently courts had
also required "mutuality" of estoppel before issue preclusion
could be invoked. This concept mandated that a party asserting collateral estoppel against another be equally bound by
the prior determination. 7 Thus, only a party to the original action or his privy could assert, or be subject to, collateral estoppel in a subsequent action.8
Within the past forty years the mutuality requirement has
been criticized as an irrational limitation on the use of collateral estoppel. The California case of Bernhard v. Bank of
America National Trust and Savings Association,9 in which
the court held that "[n]o satisfactory rationalization has been
advanced for the requirement of mutuality,"' 0 was one of the
first and most influential decisions abandoning the requirement of mutuality. Following Bernhard, a number of courts,
both state" and federal,' 2 abandoned the doctrine. In Bonder4. Id.

5. Id.
6. In re Piper Aircraft Distrib. Sys. Antitrust Litigation, 551 F.2d 213, 218-19 (8th
Cir. 1977); 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACrICE T 0.443[1] (2d ed. 1979).
7. See generally 1B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACUICE 0.441[3] (2d ed. 1979).
8. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). There, the Supreme Court held that due
process requirements would prevent a party from being bound by a determination
made in an action to which he was not a party. Thus, the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must always have been a party or privy to the prior adjudication. But see Note, Collateral Estoppel of Nonparties, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1485 (1974).
9. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
10. Id. at 812, 122 P.2d at 895.
11. See, e.g., Gorski v. Commercial Ins. Co., 206 F. Supp. 11 (E.D. Wis. 1962);
DePolo v. Greig, 338 Mich. 703, 62 N.W.2d 441 (1954); B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19
N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967); Crosland-Cullen Co. v. Cros-
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Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation,'3 the United States Supreme Court recognized and apparently adopted the recent trend'4 away from mutuality of
estoppel.
A number of courts, however, have expressly declined to
abandon mutuality' 5 and several commentators have vigorously defended the doctrine" arguing that a variety of circumstances may make it unfair to allow a nonparty to assert collateral estoppel.' 7 Recognizing the potential unfairness
involved with nonmutual estoppel, courts that have rejected
mutuality have usually allowed assertion of collateral estoppel
only where the party against whom it is asserted had a "full
and fair opportunity to litigate" the issue in the prior action.
Thus, courts have scrutinized the prior litigation to assure
that the party to be precluded had litigated with full vigor and
8
had had an opportunity to be heard.
land, 249 N.C. 167, 105 S.E.2d 665 (1958); Bahler v. Fletcher, 257 Or. 1, 474 P.2d 329
(1970).
12. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 576 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1978); Windham v.
American Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1977); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d
944 (2d Cir. 1964); Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1950).
13. 402 U.S. 313 (1971). Subsequent to the Blonder-Tongue decision, there was
some question as to whether the Court's rejection of mutuality was limited to the
facts of that case. However, that controversy was resolved by the Court in Parklane,
where it unequivocally rejected the doctrine. See 99 S. Ct. at 649.
14. See, e.g., 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.41211] (2d ed. Supp. 1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

§ 88 app., Comment b, at 162-63 (Tent. Draft No.

3, 1976); Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CAMF. L. REv. 25, 38-47
(1965).
15. See, e.g., Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. App. 2d 762, 327 P.2d 111 (1958);
Reardon v. Allen, 88 N.J. Super. 560, 213 A.2d 26 (1965).
16. See, e.g., Greenebaum, In Defense of the Doctrine of Mutuality of Estoppel, 45
IND. L.J. 1 (1969); Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35
TUL. L. REv. 301 (1961).

17. See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

§§ 68.1, 88 app. (Tent. Draft No. 3,

1976). Section 68.1 sets forth five circumstances in which a party will not be precluded from relitigating an issue where collateral estoppel is asserted by a party to the
prior action. Section 88 adds eight situations to the five in § 68.1 and provides that
issue preclusion asserted by a stranger to the previous litigation should be denied
under any of the thirteen sets of circumstances. For a more thorough discussion, see
text accompanying notes 63-69 infra.
18. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation,
402 U.S. 313 (1971); Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d
532 (2d Cir. 1965) (rejecting mutality but refusing to allow collateral estoppel due to
unfairness); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964); In re Transocean
Tender Offer Sec. Litigation, 455 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. 111. 1978); Currie, Mutuality of
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Judicial and scholarly uneasiness with the abolition of mutuality has been most acute where collateral estoppel has been
used offensively. Some courts and commentators, contending
that there are important distinctions to be made between offensive and defensive use of collateral estoppel, have urged
that offensive use of collateral estoppel not be allowed in the
absence of mutuality.'9 Others have argued that offensive use
is proper so long as the defendant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the prior action.2 0 The Supreme Court encountered this particular controversy in Parklane.
II.

THE

Parklane OPINION

In November of 1974 a stockholder class action was commenced against Parklane Hosiery Company and twelve of its
officers, directors and stockholders alleging that a materially
false and misleading proxy statement had been issued in connection with a merger plan2 ' in violation of the Securities and
Exchange Act as well as rules and regulations promulgated by
the Securities and Exchange Commission. 2

The plaintiff

sought damages and costs in addition to rescission of the
merger. In May of 1976 the Securities and Exchange Commission commenced a government enforcement action against
Parklane charging that the proxy statement issued by the ofCollateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as Currie]. Semmel, CollateralEstoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of
Parties, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1457 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Semmel].
19. See, e.g., Spettigue v. Mahoney, 8 Ariz. App. 281, 445 P.2d 557 (1968);
Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. App. 2d 762, 327 P.2d 111 (1958); Reardon v. Allen, 88
N. J. Super. 560, 213 A.2d 26 (1965); Note, The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive
Assertion of Collateral Estoppel by a Nonparty, 35 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 1010 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Impacts of CollateralEstoppel].
20. See, e.g., Hann v. Carson, 462 F. Supp. 854 (M.D. Fla. 1978); In re Transocean Tender Offer Sec. Litigation, 455 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill. 1978); B.R. DeWitt,
Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967).
21. 99 S. Ct. at 648 n.1. It was alleged that the proxy statement was false and
misleading because it failed to inform the stockholders that (1) Parklane's president
would benefit financially as a result of the merger, (2) present renegotiation of a lease
stood to increase the cash flow of the corporation and (3) appraisers were given insufficient information and their appraisal of the fair market value of Parklane's stock was
therefore inaccurate.
22. Id. at 648. Plaintiff claimed the proxy statement violated §§ 14(a), 10(b), and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 895, 891, 899, as amended, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78n(a), 78j(b), and 78t(a) as well as various rules and regulations of the
Securities and Exchnge Commission.
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ficers, directors and stockholders involved in the merger plan
was false and misleading in essentially the same respects as
alleged by the plaintiff in the stockholder class action.2 The
SEC requested an injunction and other equitable relief.
In the SEC action, which came to trial first, the district
court found that the proxy statement was materially false and
misleading. 4 With this judgment in hand the plaintiff in the
stockholder action moved for partial summary judgment
claiming Parklane should be precluded from relitigating issues
determined in the SEC action. The motion was denied by the
district court, but the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed, holding that the use of collateral estoppel was
proper.?
The Supreme Court addressed two major questions: (1)
whether a plaintiff who was neither a party nor in privity with
a party to a prior action may assert collateral estoppel offensively; and (2) whether preventing a defendant in a legal action from relitigating issues previously resolved in an equitable
action is violative of that defendant's seventh amendment
right to a jury trial. 6
With respect to the first issue, the Court noted that a number of factors militate against the offensive use of collateral
estoppel. First, offensive collateral estoppel may discourage
potential plaintiffs from joining in a single action since a potential plaintiff who sits on the sidelines may reap the benefits
of a favorable judgment obtained by another plaintiff while
not being bound by an adverse judgment. Thus, a "wait and
see" attitude could be fostered and unnecessary multiplicity of
suits encouraged. 27 Second, offensive use could be unfair to a
defendant. If the first action had been one for an insignificant
amount of damages or if future actions were not reasonably
23. SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 558
F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977).
24. 422 F. Supp. at 486.
25. Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1977).
26. 99 S. Ct. at 652. Since the SEC action sought only equitable relief, the defendants had no right to a jury trial. In the action for damages brought by the stockholders such a right would have existed but for the prior SEC action. Thus, the defendants claimed that treating issues determined in the SEC action as conclusive with
respect to the stockholder action denied them their right to a jury trial as to these
issues.
27. Id. at 651.
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foreseeable, the defendant may not have litigated with as
much vigor as he otherwise would have. If the judgment rendered in the first action was inconsistent with other judgments
or if some significant procedural device were available to the
defendant in the second action which had not been available
issues
in the first, preventing the defendant from relitigating
2
determined in the prior action would be unjust.

With the foregoing considerations in mind the Court set
forth the following rule:
The general rule should be that in cases where a plaintiff
could easily have joined in the earlier action or where, either
for the reasons discussed above or for other reasons, the application of offensive collateral estoppel would be unfair to
should not allow the use of offenthe defendant, a trial judge
2
sive collateral estoppel.

1

The Court went on to hold that Parklane had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issues involved in the SEC action 3
and that the plaintiff in the stockholder action could not easily have joined in the prior action. 3' Therefore, offensive use of
collateral estoppel was held to be proper. The Court further
held that the seventh amendment did not require that the defendants in Parklane be afforded an opportunity to relitigate
before a jury those issues previously determined in the SEC
action.

32

28. Id.
29. Id. at 651-52.
30. Id. at 652. The Court stated:
First, in light of the serious allegations made in the SEC's complaint against
the petitioners, as well as the foreseeability of subsequent private suits that
typically follow a successful government judgment, the petitioners had every
incentive to litigate the SEC lawsuit fully and vigorously. Second, the judgment in the Commission action was not inconsistent with any previous decision. Finally, there will in the respondent's action be no procedural opportunities available to the petitioner that were unavailable in the first action of a
kind that might be likely to cause a different result (footnotes omitted).
31. Id. at 652 & n.17. The Court noted that the Second Circuit had expressed a
strong policy against allowing stockholders to intervene in an SEC action. SEC v.
Everest Management Corp., 475 F.2d 1236, 1240 (2d Cir. 1972). Further, consolidation
of a private action with one brought by the SEC without the latter's consent is prohibited by statute. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(g) (1976).
32. 99 S. Ct. at 654-55.
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OFFENSIVE USE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

The general rule set forth by the Court contains a two-part
test to be applied by trial courts in determining whether offensive use of collateral estoppel is proper. Offensive use is permissible only if (1) the plaintiff could not easily have joined in
the prior action, and (2) it would not be unfair to the defendant to allow its use.33 The objective of the rule is to regulate
the offensive use of collateral estoppel in such a way as to promote judicial economy and consistency of judgments, while at
the same time insuring defendant's right to fully and fairly
litigate the claims against him. 34 While the Court's two-part
test would appear to be a simple, workable approach to the
offensive use of collateral estoppel, it falls far short of meeting
this objective. Although the potential unfairness limitation, if
properly applied, could adequately protect rights of defendants, the Court's application of the rule in Parklane is questionable. The ease of joinder limitation, on the other hand, is
fundamentally unsound and may thus present lower federal
courts with substantial interpretive difficulties.
A. Ease of Joinder
The Court began with the premise that "offensive use of
collateral estoppel does not promote judicial economy in the
same manner as defensive use does."" The availability of collateral estoppel as an offensive tool creates an incentive for
plaintiffs to adopt a "wait and see" posture which, in turn,
leads to the unnecessary multiplicity of suits. In the Court's
view, restricting the offensive use of of collateral estoppel will
eliminate this incentive and thereby deter plaintiffs from failing to join in a single action.36
The Court correctly recognized that there are important
distinctions between plaintiffs who could not easily have
joined the prior action due to practical, procedural or jurisdictional considerations, and those who could have effected joinder without significant difficulty. With respect to plaintiffs in
the first category, subsequent actions are procedural "necessi33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 651-52.
See text accompanying note 2 supra.
99 S. Ct. at 650.
Id. at 650-51.
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ties" and, presumably, the unavailability of collateral estoppel
would have no deterrent effect. For these plaintiffs, then, the
use of the doctrine will expedite these "necessary" actions,
thereby fostering judicial economy and consistency of judgments. Where plaintiffs could easily have joined in a single
action, the Court's refusal to allow offensive use of the doctrine will presumably have a deterrent effect since the subsequent suits are tactical "luxuries" which are less attractive
once collateral estoppel is no longer available. Thus, the success of the ease of joinder limitation necessarily depends on
whether it will in fact have a deterrent effect on this latter
category of plaintiffs.
The fundamental premise underlying the ease of joinder
rule is the notion that offensive use of collateral estoppel gives
a plaintiff "every incentive to adopt a 'wait and see' attitude
[which] will likely increase rather than decrease the total
amount of litigation, since the potential plaintiffs will have
everything to gain and nothing to lose by not intervening in
the first action. ' 3 However, even if collateral estoppel is unavailable, substantial benefits may await plaintiffs who adopt
a "wait and see" posture. If the defendant prevails in the first
action a potential plaintiff will have the option of either forging ahead, having learned from his predecessor's mistakes, or
choosing not to pursue the claim, thereby saving himself the
expense of litigation. If the first plaintiff prevails in the earlier
suit, the second plaintiff will have the advantage of proceeding
down a lighted path. While the ease of joinder test might discourage some plaintiffs from not intervening in a prior action,
other causal, factors may be sufficient to render any deterrent
impact de minimis. Since the limitation is unlikely to achieve
its objective, the ultimate impact of the rule may well be antithetical to principles of judicial economy. Where a plaintiff
could easily have joined in a prior action, but did not, the issues previously determined must be relitigated even if the defendant has already had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
them. Therefore, the ease of joinder limitation has little to offer in the way of judicial economy.

37. Id. at 651 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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The test has even less to offer with respect to consistency
of judgments. Each time a court determines that issues must
be relitigated, there is the possibility the issue will be determined differently in the second hearing. If this occurs, each
litigant will justifiably believe he was treated unfairly; the defendant because he did not prevail in the first action, and the
plaintiff because he did not prevail in the subsequent action.
This tends to impeach and undercut the validity and reliability of the judicial process as well as expose litigants to inconsistent rights and liabilities.
Since the ease of joinder test appears unlikely to promote
judicial econofny or consistency of judgments, the question remains: why should it make any difference that a potential
plaintiff failed to join in a prior action when the defendant has
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues involved
in a later action. Perhaps in the end the Court simply objects
to the plaintiff being able to engage in "riskless litigation." If
so, this is merely a throwback to the doctrine of mutuality
38
which the Court so forcefully criticizes.
In light of the foregoing analysis it remains to be determined just how the ease of joinder test is to be interpreted and
under what circumstances it should preclude the offensive assertion of collateral estoppel. Unfortunately, the Court's decision provides little guidance to assist lower courts in making
this determination.
Since the plaintiff's claim in Parklane necessarily involved
issues identical to those involved in the prior action, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would presumably have permitted a joinder,3 9 intervention 0 or consolidation 4 ' unless the prior
action were a criminal prosecution,4 2 a government enforcement action,4 3 an action in which joinder is prohibited or lim38. See, e.g., 99 S. Ct. 649; Blonder-Topgue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill.
Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
39. FED. R. CIS. P. 20(a).
40. Id. at Rule 24.
41. Id. at Rule 42(a).
42. The joinder provisions contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do
not apply to criminal actions.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976), holding that there is a strong judicial
policy against allowing private intervention into government enforcement actions. See
also SEC v. Everest Management Corp., 475 F.2d 1236 (2d Cir. 1972).
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ited by statute," or an action, the determination of which was
necessary for the latter plaintiff's claim to mature.45 Since the
first action in Parklane was a government enforcement action
the Court did not look beyond the mere possibility of joinder
when applying its test because "the respondent probably
could not have joined in the injunctive action brought by the
SEC even had he so desired."" A rule of law which would prohibit the offensive use of collateral estoppel where the sheer
possibility of joinder existed in the first action is advocated by
two of the commentators cited by the Court. 47 However, it

seems unlikely that the Court intended its rule to be interpreted so narrowly.
First, the Court phased its rule in terms of "ease" rather
than "possibility" or "likelihood" of joinder, thus suggesting
that other factors should be considered. Second, the Court
stated that trial courts must have broad discretion to determine when offensive use of collateral estoppel is proper.4
Since the question of the possibility of joinder may be answered with virtual certainty, courts would be precluded from
exercising any kind of discretion unless other factors were considered. Finally, the Restatement (Second) of Judgments and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would appear to favor a
broader interpretation. The Restatement seems to endorse the
use of a "reasonableness" standard in determining whether a
plaintiff could have joined,'49 and the federal rules discourage
44. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u(g) (1976) prohibiting consolidation of a private action with one brought by the SEC without the SEC's consent.
45. See, e.g., Impacts of CollateralEstoppel, supra note 19, at 1049-51. There the
author lists ten categories of cases in which there are multiple claimants and identical
issues, but where the claims do not ordinarily arise at the same time.
46. 99 S. Ct. at 652.
47. Impacts of CollateralEstoppel, supranote 19, at 1054; Semmel, supra note 18,
at 1475.
48. 99 S. Ct. at 651.
49. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88(3) (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1975) which provides that application of collateral estoppel may be denied if the party
asserting it "could have effected joinder in the first action between himself and his
present adversary." In RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88 app., Comment e
(Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976), the reporter qualifies this rule by stating that one may be
refused the benefits of "offensive" issue preclusion where he was in such a position
that he might reasonably have been expected to join in the prior action. It is interesting to observe that in the reporter's notes to Comment e, at 173, it is stated:
[A] co-defendant in the first action who has succeeded in obtaining severance
of the trial of the claim against him may be refused the benefits of preclusion
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joinder, intervention or consolidation where inconvenience,
prejudice or delay may result 0
Even accepting this broader interpretation, the rule should
be applied in light of its ultimate purpose of deterrence. The
crucial inquiry, then, should focus on whether the potential
plaintiff would have joined in a prior action had collateral estoppel been unavailable. This is the same as asking whether
the plaintiff did, in fact, adopt a "wait and see" posture. However, as previously shown, the ease of joinder limitation is unlikely to deter plaintiffs from adopting this posture. Therefore,
the limitation should arguably be accorded little, if any,
weight in determining whether offensive use of collateral estoppel is proper. Moreover, the broad discretion given trial
courts in applying the general rule provides the means by
which primary significance may be attached to the potential
unfairness aspect of the rule, which appears to be a more rational and time-tested limitation on the use of collateral
estoppel.
B. Potential Unfairness
Ever since the demise of the requirement of mutuality in
Bernhard5 courts have been concerned with whether the party
against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a "full and
fair opportunity to litigate'' the issues involved in the prior
action.5 2 Thus, the concerns expressed by the Supreme Court
in Parklane with respect to potential unfairness in allowing offensive use of collateral estoppel are not new. Further, these
unfair situations may well arise irrespective of whether collateral estoppel is applied offensively or defensively. 3 Therefore,
arising from a determination adverse to the plaintiff in the trial involving the
other defendant. A claimant who simply stayed out of a prior action between
others, on the other hand, may ordinarily invoke the benefits of a judgment
where the prior action otherwise fulfills the criteria for preclusion.

Thus, it seems the most that can be said of the Restatement is that it adopts a rather
expansive "ease of joinder" rule if, in fact, it adopts such a rule at all.
50. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 20(b), 24(b), 42(b).
51. 19 Cal.2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
52. See authorities cited in note 18 supra.
53. Some commentators have observed that whether the defendant had full opportunity and incentive to litigate the issues in the prior action goes more to his posture
there and less to whether he is the plaintiff or defendant in the subsequent action. See
generally Currie, supra note 18; Semmel, supra note 18.
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an abundance of cases and commentaries exist to which trial
courts may look when deciding whether offensive use of collateral estoppel would be unfair to a defendant." Between the
courts and commentators, all of the unfair situations noted in
Parklane,5 5 plus a handful of others, have been thoroughly
discussed.
Application of the Court's potential unfairness test will
most likely prevent use of issue preclusion where: (1) the first
action is for nominal damages;" (2) the second action was not
reasonably foreseeable at the time the prior determination was
made; 57 (3) the prior determination is inconsistent with one or
more previous judgments in favor of the defendant; 58 (4) the
second action affords the defendant procedural opportunities
unavailable in the first action which could readily cause a different result; 51 (5) the prior judgment involved an assessment
of comparative fault or was -the result of a compromise verdict;"° (6) treating the prior determination as conclusive would
be incompatible with a particular remedial scheme" and (7)
54. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS Reporter's Note § 88 app.
(Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976) for a rather lengthy list of cases and articles dealing with
the "full and fair" test. Although the general rule in Parklaneis a matter of federal
law, analysis of state cases may still be helpful with respect to fairness problems,
since many of the same kinds of difficulties encountered in litigation in state courts
will arise in federal courts as weil.
55. 99 S. Ct. at 651.
56. See, e.g., Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532
(2d Cir. 1965); The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir. 1944); Pennington v. Snow, 471 P.2d 370 (Alas. 1970); Semmel, supra note 18, at 1464-65.
57. See, e.g., James Talcott, Inc. v. Allahabad Bank, Ltd., 444 F.2d 451 (5th Cir.
1971) (discussing foreseeability but holding subsequent action was forseeable); The

Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1944);

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDG-

§ 68.1(e)(ii) app. (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976); Currie, supra note 18, at 289.
58. See, e.g., Blumcraft v. Kawneer Co., 482 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1973); Fink v.
Coates, 323 F. Supp. 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTs §
88(4) app. (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976); Currie, supra note 18, at 281, 285-89.
59. See, e.g., Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Idel-Stein, 494 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1974);
Allen v. Kaplan, 255 Md. 409, 258 A.2d 211 (1969); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88(2) app. (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976).
60. See, e.g., Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532
(2d Cir. 1965); Taylor- v. Hawkinson, 47 Cal. 2d 893, 306 P.2d 797 (1957); RESTATEMENTS

MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

§ 88(5) app. (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976).

61. See, e.g., Divine v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1974); Purex Corp. v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 308 F. Supp. 584 (C.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd, 453 F.2d 288 (9th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1065 (1972); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §
88(1) app. (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976).
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to obthe defendant did not have the opportunity or incentive
62
tain appellate review of the prior determination.
In applying the "full and fair" test to Parklane, the Supreme Court determined that the first action was sufficiently
serious and subsequent actions sufficiently foreseeable to provide the defendants with incentive to fully litigate the matter.6 3 Further, the SEC determination was not inconsistent

with any prior judgment. 4 Finally, the Court held that there
were no procedural opportunities available to the defendants
"that were unavailable in the first action of a kind that might
be likely to cause a different result." 5 With respect to this last
ruling the Court stated in a footnote: "[T]he presence or absence of a jury as factfinder is basically neutral, quite unlike,
for example, the necessity of defending the first lawsuit in an
inconvenient forum." 66 This particular holding may prove to
be somewhat problematic.
It is true that where the same facts exist, the same law
applies, the same discovery devices are available and the same
burden of proof and presumptions are present, the mode of a
trial, whether before a judge or jury, should not have an impact on the resulting determination. Indeed, in the majority of
civil actions this will probably be the case. However, there are
cases in which the availability of a jury trial may be expected
to have a significant impact on the result. Justice Rehnquist's
remarks in his dissenting opinion in Parklane are particularly
pertinent with respect to this latter type of case.
[T]hose who drafted the Declaration of Independence and
debated so passionately the proposed Constitution during
the ratification period, would indeed be astounded to learn
that the presence or absence of a jury trial is merely "neutral" . . . [a]nd I suspect that anyone who litigates cases

before juries in the 1970's would be equally amazed to hear
of the supposed lack of distinction between trial by court
and trial by jury. 7
62. See, e.g., Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532
(2d Cir. 1965); Minor v. Lapp, 220 Cal. App.2d 582, 33 Cal. Rptr. 864 (1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1(a) app. (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976); Semmel,
supra note 18, at 1470-71.
63. 99 S. Ct. at 652.

64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at n.19.
67. Id. at 663.
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Thus, although the mode of trial is theoretically neutral, there
is a strong argument that in some situations the availability of
a jury trial will definitely be a procedural opportunity "of a
kind that might be likely to cause a different result."
Further, the holding is contrary not only to a strong federal
policy favoring jury trials," but also to the view of the Restatement 9 and of cases which have considered the question of the
conclusiveness of equitable determinations in later legal actions." Consequently, courts may be left wondering what factors are to be considered in determining whether the offensive
use of collateral estoppel is fair to the defendant, especially
since the Restatement, prior federal case decisions and strong
federal policies were ignored by the Supreme Court in its application of the rule. This would, in turn, reduce the effectiveness of the "full and fair" test in protecting the rights of defendants against whom collateral estoppel is asserted.
IV.

SEVENTH AMENDMENT

RIGHTS

After determining that offensive use of collateral estoppel
was permissible under the general rule, the Court in Parklane
addressed the question of whether the defendants' seventh
amendment rights were violated by allowing a determination
in an equitable action to be conclusive for purposes of a subsequent legal action. 7' Although this issue is related in some respects to the question of whether such use of issue preclusion
is fair to a defendant, the two are distinct. Denying the defendant an opportunity to relitigate the issues before a jury might
be unfair although entirely constitutional. Conversely, this situation, while fair, might constitute a violation of a defen68. See, e.g., Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-11 (1959) where

the Court stated: "[Oinly under the most imperative circumstances, circumstances
which in view of the flexible procedures of the Federal Rules we cannot now anticipate, can the right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through prior determination of
equitable claims." (footnotes omitted).

69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF

JUGnosaMs § 88 app., Comment d (Tent. Draft

No. 3, 1976).
70. See Rachel v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970); McCook v. Standard Oil Co.,
393 F. Supp. 256 (C.D. Cal. 1975).

71. 99 S. Ct. at 652. '
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dant's seventh amendment jury trial rights. Thus, this seventh amendment question must be considered apart from any
unfairness problems associated with the offensive use of collateral estoppel.
The seventh amendment provides: "In Suits at common
law, where the value in controversy shall exceed $20, the right
of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
72
States, than according to the rules of the common law."73
Seizing upon the word "preserved," several commentators
have argued, as did Justice Rehnquist in his Parklane dissent, 74 that a litigant cannot be denied the opportunity for a
jury trial if that opportunity would have existed in 1791. Proponents of this view reason that because of the mutuality requirement which attended the doctrine of collateral estoppel
in 1791, a defendant who had issues resolved adversely to him
in a prior equitable action would have an opportunity to relitigate those issues before a jury in a subsequent legal action
brought by a different plaintiff. Since the right to a jury trial
existed at the time the seventh amendment was drafted, that
right must be preserved even though the mutuality require75
ment has been abandoned.
The majority in Parklane rejected this argument. 7 The
Court observed that "at common law, a litigant was not entitled to have a jury determine issues that had been previously
adjudicated by a chancellor in equity. '77 Thus, any right a defendant would have had to relitigate issues in a legal action
brought by a plaintiff who was not party to a prior equitable
proceeding in which the issues had been determined, would
arise not by virtue of the seventh amendment, but by operation of the requirement of mutuality. The mutuality require72. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
73. See, e.g., Note, Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Company: The Seventh Amendment and CollateralEstoppel, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 861, 866-69 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as Seventh Amendment]; Note, Nonmutual Collateral Estoppel and the Seventh
Amendment Jury Trial Right, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 75, 86-93 (1978).
74. 99 S. Ct. at 658-61.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 653-54. See also Shapiro & Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trials in Civil
Cases:A Comment on Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARV. L. REv. 442, 448-58 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Shapiro & Coquillette].
77. 99 S. Ct. at 652.
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ment was not designed to preserve jury trial rights. At common law, mutuality was necessary for the assertion of
collateral estoppel regardless of whether the prior action was
before a jury or to a court. Further, where mutuality of estoppel existed, a prior determination was conclusive whether it
was legal or equitable. 78 Therefore, the question of when collateral estoppel may properly be used is one of procedure and
does not go to substantive seventh amendment rights.
The Court further argued that "many procedural devices
developed since 1791 that have diminished the civil jury's historic domain have been found not to be inconsistent with the
seventh amendment."7 Hence, even though the use of collateral estoppel in the absence of mutuality may prevent one
from relitigating issues before a jury, previous case law indicates that this is a constitutionally accepted limitation on the
right to a jury trial. In light of the foregoing, the majority's
rejection of the "historical inquiry" argument appears to be
sound.
A second argument supporting the proposition that the
seventh amendment will not allow an equitable determination
to be conclusive with respect to a subsequent legal action was
advanced by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
Rachal v. Hill.' There, the court was faced with an issue virtually identical to the one involved in Parkiane.Holding that
a defendant to a stockholder class action had a right to a jury
trial on issues resolved in a prior SEC suit, the court stated:
In light of the great respect afforded in Beacon Theatres
..., and its progeny, for a litigant's right to have a legal
claim tried first before a jury in an action where legal and
equitable claims are joined, it would be anomalous to hold
that the appellants have lost their right to a trial by jury on
the issue of whether they are liable to respond in damages
78. See Shapiro & Coquillette, supra note 76, at 454.
79. 99 S. Ct. at 654. In support of this proposition the Court cited Galloway v.
United States, 319 U.S. 372, 388-93 (1943) (directed verdict constitutionally permissible); Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 497-98 (1931) (retrial
limited to question of damages constitutionally permissible); Fidelity & Deposit Co.
v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 319-21 (1902) (summary judgment constitutionally
permissible).
80. 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970). See generally Note, Right to Jury Trial and Collateral Estoppel in Securities Litigation, 42 ALB. L. REv. 733 (1978); Seventh Amendment, supra note 73.
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for violations of the security laws because of a prior adverse
determination by the district court of the same issue in an
action in which their present adversary was not a party and
which arose in a different context from the present action.8'
The majority in Parklane summarily dismissed the Rachal
argument by stating that the recognition that an equitable determination could have collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent legal action was the "major premise" of the Beacon
Theatres decision. 82 In Beacon Theatres the Court held that
since the determination of legal issues in an equitable action
"might operate either by way of res judicata or collateral estoppel" to preclude a party from having a subsequent jury
trial on those issues," the legal issues should be tried first so
as to preserve the jury trial right.
Although it is true that prior to Beacon Theatres an equitable determination would be conclusive in a subsequent legal
action, what the Court apparently failed to consider is that
such a policy is no longer reasonable after the abandonment of
the "equitable clean-up" doctrine. At common law, a litigant
could not complain about being precluded from relitigating legal issues previously determined in an equitable action, since,
had those issues been presented in their legal context in the
prior action, the court could nonetheless have disposed of
them. However, once the "equitable clean-up" doctrine was
rejected, it would appear to be unjust to hold that a defendant
has no right to a jury trial in a legal action with respect to
issues that had been determined in a prior equitable action.
Thus, in Parklanethe defendants would have had a right to a
jury trial on issues involved in the stockholder class action had
the plaintiff been able to join in the prior SEC suit. However,
since the plaintiff encountered a joinder problem, the defendants lost their seventh amendment right to a jury trial. The
Parklane majority seems to have advanced no persuasive reason why a defendant's seventh amendment rights should depend upon his opponent's joinder problems.
81. 435 F.2d at 64 (citing Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959)).
82. 99 S. Ct. at 653.
83. 359 U.S. 500, 504 (1959) (citing Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 252 F.2d
864 (9th Cir. 1958)).
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V.

CONCLUSION

Each part of the two-part rule formulated by the Court in
Parklane has a distinct objective. The ease of joinder limitation was intended to promote judicial economy and uniformity
of judgments by encouraging potential plaintiffs to join in a
single action against a common defendant. This limitation,
however, will most likely result in the unnecessary relitigation
of issues and a greater risk of inconsistent judgments. The potential unfairness limitation was meant to protect the rights of
a defendant against whom collateral estoppel is asserted. The
right to a jury trial has constitutional as well as procedural
significance and should be carefully guarded. The defendants
in Parklane were precluded from relitigating before a jury
those issues resolved in the prior SEC action merely because
of a procedural quirk which prevented the stockholders from
joining that prior action. Thus, in Parklane, the procedural
and constitutional rights of the defendants may not have been
adequately protected. Therefore, it appears that the objective
of the potential unfairness limitation was not achieved. In
summary, the impact of the majority opinion is best synthesized by Justice Rehnquist: "The ultimate irony of today's decision is that its potential for significantly conserving the resources of either the litigants or the judiciary is doubtful at
best. [Thus, there is] . . .absolutely no reason to frustrate so
cavalierly the important federal policy favoring jury decisions
of disputed fact questions."8 4
DAVID D. WILMOTH
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INTRODUCTION

In Caban v. Mohanmed,1 the United States Supreme
Court, in a five to four split decision, held that an unwed fa84. 99 S. Ct. at 664 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1. 99 S. Ct. 1760 (1979).

